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Abstract
The Internet is known to have had a powerful impact on on-line retailer strategies in
markets characterised by long-tail distribution of sales [1]. Such retailers can exploit the
long tail of the market, since they are effectively without physical limit on the number of
choices on offer. Here we examine two extensions of this phenomenon. First, we introduce
turnover into the long-tail distribution of sales. Although over any given period such as a
week or a month, the distribution is right-skewed and often power law distributed, over time
there is considerable turnover in the rankings of sales of individual products. Second, we
establish some initial results on the implications for shelf-space strategy of physical retailers
in such markets.
1 Introduction
In his recent book, The Long Tail, Chris Anderson [2] qualitatively reviews how the Internet
changes the dynamics of markets characterized by long-tailed distributions of sales, such that a
few titles sell enormous amounts and most titles (the long tail) sell very little (Figure 1). Recog-
nized at least since the early 20th century [32, 23, 44] long-tailed distributions (and, specifically,
power law distributions) in economics and society have been an exceedingly popular subject in
the last 15 years [10, 4, 5, 9, 18, 19, 25, 24, 26, 27, 29].
Although power laws have become a well-worn subject, with multiple potential causes rec-
ognized [26], Anderson [1, 2] usefully identified a profound transition associated with the rise of
Internet retailers, who can exploit the long tail of the market, as they are effectively without
physical limit on the number of choices they can offer. A retailer in a physical building, of course,
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Figure 1: Anderson’s [1, 2] model of profit thresholds in an economy characterised by power law
sales distributions, and physical retailers (real items from real shelves), digital retailers (digital
goods from digital shelves) and hybrid retailers (physical goods from digital shelves).
cannot afford the space to stock the low-selling items beyond some point in the long tail (Figure
1).
In a simplified sense, if a retailer has space for y different items in the store, then a reasonable
strategy is to stock the top y best-selling items, as determined by market data. In contrast, an
Internet retailer can sell items within the long tail, which can yield sales (area under the curve)
comparable to those of the physical retailers selling the blockbusters at the top end (Figure 1).
Of course, in practice a retailer may want to follow alternative strategies from the one of
stocking the top y products. Profit margins, for example, might be higher on certain products
with low sales, the retailer may feel that specializing in a ‘niche’ in the particular market may
increase the chances of survival, and so on. But for a retailer selling into the mass market, a
good initial strategy to consider is one of selling the top y items. It is this strategy which we
analyse and for which we establish initial results.
A crucial factor to take into account is the turnover in the sales (and hence the rankings)
of individual products. The distribution in Figure 1 is of course a stylized representation of the
power law distribution of sales at a given point in time. Over time, the relative popularity of
the sales of the individual products will change. So although the distribution of sales may look
very similar over time, taking snapshots of it at different points in time, the positions of the
individual items within it will vary. Indeed, in most fashion markets new items will constantly
enter the market.
We consider a fashion-based model of consumer choice which is capable of generating power
law distributions of sales such as are observed in practice, and which takes into account both
turnover over time in the relative sales of a given set of items, and innovation in the sense that
entirely new items become offered for sale. The model has antecedents in the neutral model of
population dynamics in biology [20, 28], but its relevance to long-tail consumer markets has been
demonstrated by studies that show that the model is capable of explaining both the distribution
of outcomes and the turnover over time in, for example, pop music, first names and dog breeds
in the United States [21, 22, 6].
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2 A fashion based model of consumer choice
Standard consumer choice theory in economics assumes atomised individuals exercise choice in
an attempt to maximise utility subject to a budget constraint. In this approach, given an indi-
viduals tastes and preferences, decisions are taken on the basis of the attributes of the various
products, such as price and quality.
In recent decades, the conventional theory has been extended to allow for factors such as the
cost of gathering information [40], imperfections in the perception of information and limitations
to consumers cognitive powers in gathering and processing information [38]. So decisions are not
necessarily made in a fully rational way, but are nevertheless based on the (perceived) attributes
of the products, without direct reference to the choices of others (which can affect choice indi-
rectly by their effect on relative prices).
Almost 50 years ago, Tintner [41] extended classical consumer choice theory by assuming that
individual utility depended not merely on an individuals consumption, but on the consumption
patterns of other people. This extension introduced far greater indeterminacy into the signs of
income and price elasticities than standard theory.
In general, however, economists have paid little attention to markets in which fashion is im-
portant [11]; i.e., markets in which the decisions of others can affect directly the choices made
by an individual. Social influences are generally only invoked for cases considered exceptional,
such as ‘irrational’ stock market bubbles or real estate crises.
Interest in such markets has, however, been much greater outside of economics. There is
strong empirical evidence that in markets where the decisions by others strongly influence indi-
vidual choice, products that are superior in terms of their attributes may do no better than ones
which are worse [34, 13, 42]. Even charitable donations can be highly subject to fashion [36].
Such markets are characterised by randomness and inherent unpredictability [34].
An important development has been models of ‘binary choice with externalities’ [35, 43, 42].
In many social and economic contexts, individuals are faced with a choice between two alter-
native actions, and their decision depends, at least in part, on the actions of other individuals
[31]. An important feature of such systems is that they are ‘robust yet fragile’. In other words,
behaviour may remain stable for long periods of time and then suddenly exhibit a cascade in
which behaviour changes on a large scale across the individuals within the system [43, 30, 42].
Our model has similar characteristics, but its relevance is to phenomena such as popular
culture, in which consumers face many choices rather than a simple binary decision between two
alternative courses of action. Almost by definition, ‘popular culture’ reflects the effects of most
people imitating those around them. As recently re-emphasised by a music downloading experi-
ment [34], copied trends and fashions are constantly changing, with future outcomes potentially
irrational and nearly impossible to predict. Considering markets dominated by peer-to-peer in-
fluence, our approach is essentially to model the copying by individuals of choices made by others
when many different choices are on offer.
In markets in which many products are on offer, with little to distinguish them in terms of
their ‘objective’ attributes, a sensible behavioural choice rule for an individual to adopt is one of
random copying. We can think of such markets as being ‘pure’ fashion markets: an individual
copies the choice of another individual at random. So at any point in time, the probability of
choosing any particular item depends upon its relative popularity. However, a further key feature
of such markets is that there is constant innovation, in the sense that new products are being
introduced all the time.
We populate the model with N individuals, as well as x0 products initially from which to
choose. The number, x, of products on offer is allowed to vary over time, whereas the number
of individuals, N , is fixed. When each individual has made a choice, the initial conditions are
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Figure 2: Simulation results of the pure fashion model, showing double-log plots of: (Left)
Probability P (S) of accumulated sales S for different values of Nµ. For Nµ = 2 (green), the
power-law exponent α is 1.54± 0.01, estimated by maximum likelihood [26]. (Right) Effects of
innovation fraction µ on mean turnover rate z¯ in the top 5 variants (600 runs of 1000 time steps;
10 runs averaged for each of 60 different combinations of N and µ). The population size N has
only a small effect on turnover compared to µ [6]; the error bars show the standard deviation
in runs from N = 100 to N = 1, 000. The best fit (r2 = 0.977) through the data is a function
turnover ∼ µ0.4. As a simpler rule of thumb, a useful approximation is z ≈ y√µ [6].
set. We start with one product per individual, or N = x0, but the model is robust with respect
to this initial condition (because the number of different products on offer soon stablises, as we
discuss below).
The model then proceeds in a series of steps. In each step, each individual makes one further
choice. An additional µN products are introduced, where µ  1 represents the fraction of in-
dividuals choosing novel items, via the µN individuals (selected at random) who each choose a
new product; each individual buys only one product. The remaining (1− µ)N individuals select
from the xt−1 products available in the previous step. Each individual selects product i with
the probability equal to product i’s proportion of total sales in the previous period. In other
words, (s)he chooses product i with probability si/N , where si denotes the sales of product i in
the previous period.
So the choice rules have two components. In each period, (1 − µ)N individuals use a rule
which is identical to that of the well-known model of preferential attachment, which is known
to yield a long tail with asymptotic form p(s) ∼ s−3 [3]. The remaining µN individuals (µ is
typically small, so these are a small minority) each select a product which was not previously on
offer. This second rule is essential in order for the model to be able to account for the turnover
which is observed in the power law rank-size distribution of sales [6].
The model has been shown to yield a simple inverse power-law distribution with exponential
cutoff for Nµ equal to or somewhat greater than one, but for Nµ ≤ 1 it yields a winner-take-all
distribution, i.e., the same choice is made by most individuals [16]. Figure 2 (left) shows the
distributions produced by the model for a range of Nµ values. The cumulative sales Si of the
products on offer follow a distribution which is a power law function for small values of the
innovation fraction
P (Si) =
1
Sαi
(1)
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There are many models that produce power law distributions, of course. The most commonly
proposed processes – including preferential attachment and the Yule process [26, 16] – produce
power laws via positive feedback in interactions between individual agents. While capturing
much of the static distributions, strict preferential attachment models struggle to acount for how
new entries can overtake old ones, and ways that the ‘rich’ occasionally become extinct. What
makes this model is the turnover which it produces within the consistuents of that distribution.
Note that x, the number of products on offer at any one time, is never more than N , i.e.,
limited to those selected by (1−µ)N individuals from the previous period, plus the new products
adopted by µN individuals in each period. A balance quickly arises between those new products
being introduced, and those dropping out of the model because achieved zero sales in the previous
period. Given the rules of the model, there is no way of ever again choosing extinct products.
So most products over time become extinct, a well-known property not just of fashion markets,
but of evolutionary systems more generally [29].
The model exhibits consistent average turnover rate on a ‘top y’ list, as demonstrated by
computer simulations [6]. We define the turnover rate z as the number of the y best selling
products that are new in any given period. Products may drop out of the top y because their
sales are no longer large enough for them to qualify, and others may enter because their sales
have increased. The rate z measures the net effect of these two.
Computer simulations of this model [21, 5, 6] have shown that the turnover rate is to a large
extent independent of the population size N (Figure 2, right), and its key determinants are the
list size y and the ‘novelty’ parameter µ, the fraction of previously unavailable products offered
per time step [6]:
z ≈ y√µ (2)
The reason N has little effect on turnover in the top y is that, as N increases, the greater
number of newly-invented variants ‘trying’ to reach the top y is effectively counterbalanced by
the increasing distance needed to reach it, textiti.e., the lengthening tail of the rank-frequency
distribution.
The modelled turnover fits evidence for steady turnover on real-world pop charts, independent
of population changes, for pop music, first names, and dog breeds in 20th century United States
[6]. The Billboard Top 200 album chart, for example, turned over at an average rate of 5.6%
per month (in terms of fraction of the 200 albums being replaced) for almost 30 years, from the
1950s to the 1980s [7, 6].
3 Turnover and the long tail
Consider a physical retailer that displays y different items in a store. The most sensible way to
choose those y items to display would be to simply take the top y items from best-seller list. If
the top y list were unchanging, there would be no need to change the inventory. Beststeller lists
of course turn over constantly, however, so how does that affect the opimal inventory size y? For
a physical retailer, there is a cost to changing the inventory as the composition of the top y list
changes. For simplicity, let us assume for demonstration that the cost of changing the inventory
is B, a fixed cost per new item to add to the inventory.
Under our pure fashion model, the turnover rate is proportional to y
√
µ, so the turnover
cost is then By
√
µ. For a power law distribution, sales of the top y bestselling items can be
approximated as
∑y
i=1 1/i
α, and A is the profit per item (we make the heroic assumption for
purposes of establishing initial results that the profit per item is fixed). The retailer then seeks
to maximise the difference between the profit obtained on the top y best-selling items minus the
5
 1
10
100
0.000001 0.00001 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1
µ
y
A/B = 1 A/B = 10
A/B = 100 A/B = 1000
A/B = 1000000
Figure 3: The dependence of optimal inventory y on the innovation parameter µ, for a range of
values of A/B. Assumes α = 3.5, as estimated for book sales [26]. Logarithmic axes.
cost of turnover:
A
y∑
i=1
1
iα
−By√µ (3)
This is maximized with respect to y when, as y is increased to the next higher rank, the additional
term of A/yα becomes less than By
√
µ. This occurs where
A
yα+1
= B
√
µ, (4)
or
y =
A
B
√
µ
1
α+1
. (5)
In other words, the optimal stock size in our hypothetical store is a function of the ‘innovation’
fraction µ, a sales/cost parameter A/B and the power law exponent of the sales distribution, α.
To take an example, the exponent α for book sales has been estimated to be 3.51 ± 0.16
[26]. As Figure 3 shows, the value of y increases only modestly with A/B, the ratio of profit
to turnover cost per item. In fact, even if the profit A is a hundred times the turnover cost B,
the optimal inventory size y is fewer than 20 items for a wide range of innovation parameter µ.
Although our model and hypothetical fixed cost assumptions are simple, the general form of the
curves in Figure 3 suggest that the ‘Blockbuster’ market could be very small indeed for physical
retailers.
This may seem extreme, but it is actually seen, for example, in book stores in busy train
stations and airports, where the book stock often consists entirely of the top 10-20 fiction and
non-fiction titles. For larger stores, it suggests it may make sense to track only the very top
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titles, while most of the rest of the titles, within the long tail, need not be rotated so often.
There is another interesting implication for non-physical retailers, which can have extremely
large profit/cost ratios A/B per item, as Anderson [1, 2] pointed out, because B is nearly zero.
The cost B is not actually zero, however, so the ratio A/B will never truly be infinite. This
is significant is because in the pure fashion model, the optimal y increases only logarithmically
with respect to A/B. As Figure 3 shows, even if A/B is one million the optimal stock is 100 or
fewer, for a realistic range of µ. In fact, if we assume µ were 0.1%, then in order to bring y to a
million titles the profit/turnover ratio A/B must be increased to about 1030. Although a very
very rough calculation, this seems extreme even for digital media.
4 Conclusion
We conclude that, for digital retailers, the optimal inventory not only cannot be infinite in the
literal sense, but may even be less than the millions of items offered by digital retailers like Ama-
zon.com. Of course, more detailed estimates would depend on factors we have not accounted
for in our simple model, such as the actual cost parameters for the company and the obvious
prestige benefit of being a supplier that stocks virtually everything. Nevertheless we generally
concur with the recent caution [15] that the long tail is by no means a guaranteed money-maker,
as the sales proceeding further and further into the long tail become so small that he marginal
cost of tracking them in rank order, even at a digital scale, might be optimised well before a
million titles and certainly before infinite titles.
We have characterized some aspects of change within the ‘Blockbusters’ and ‘Long tail’ por-
tions of sales distributions which follow power laws. In such markets, peer-to-peer influence is a
crucial factor in consumer choice. An individual is more likely to select a top selling item than
one with low sales.
The basic behavioural choice rule followed by consumers is based upon the well-known model
of preferential attachment. Crucially, however, we modify this by allowing a small fraction of in-
dividuals in each period to choose items which have not previously been on offer. In this process
unlike strict preferential attachment initially obscure new ideas can become highly popular by
chance alone.
We can make predictions for the effects of population size and innovation on the turnover
on bestseller lists. In particular, the rate of innovation is more important than population; the
turnover rate on a list of most popular variants should depend on the number of items on of-
fer and the amount of innovation, but not on the number of consumers [6]. Increases in both
population and/or innovation lead to increases in the increases the turnover in the Top y and
therefore to a reduction in the number of titles to be treated as ‘blockbusters’. As innovation is
increasingly encouraged by Internet blogs, youTube, music production software, and so on, the
result should not only be that popular culture changes faster, but also that ‘Blockbuster’ stores
should shrink their inventory further and further.
This model can provide further predictions into markets with long-tail distributions. Use-
fully, these predictions derive from a minimum of parameters. In future work, we hope to provide
additional predictions of the model, including characterizing lifespans on a best-seller list, and
projected sales of an item on the top y list (or at least the variance in those quantities) as function
of its current rank. This could provide a model for optimizing the number of each individual
item ordered, given its current sales rank and the total number of different titles stocked.
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